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1. Introduction 
The financial system is expected to mobilize savings and efficiently allocate them to 
productive projects. The existing literature shows that a well-functioning financial market and 
efficient financial intermediation can spur capital productivity and foster economic growth.  
Different financial structures may differently affect economic growth, as some structures 
can be more influential than others. Berger et al. (2004) study the role of community banks in the 
economic growth of 49 countries between 1993 and 2000. Their findings suggest that financial 
systems with larger market share and efficiency of small, private, domestically-owned banks can 
better boost economic growth. In this paper we attempt to study whether the coexistence of 
Islamic and conventional banking contributes to financial development and economic welfare.  
During the recent decades, Islamic finance has evolved and grown rapidly in many 
Muslim countries. According to The Banker (2013) Islamic finance grows at the rate of 15% to 
20% per annum. Globally, Islamic banking assets held with commercial banks are set to cross to 
$1.7t in 2013 (Ernst & Young’s Report, 2013-2014). Alongside the growth of Islamic banking, 
the empirical work on this topic has grown accordingly. The extant literature analyzes various 
features of Islamic banking and finance: investment financing (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000), 
securitization (Jobst, 2007), mortgage loans (Ebrahim, 2009), stability (Čihák and Hesse, 2010), 
relationship banking (Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü, 2011), business model (Beck et al, 2013), 
risk (Abedifar, et al., 2013), efficiency (Johnes et al, 2014; Saeed and Izzeldin, 2014), loan 
default rates (Baele et al, 2014), mutual funds (Abdelsalam et al, 2014) and valuation (Elnahass, 
et al, 2014). However there is a handful of work on the role and relative importance of Islamic 
banking in the transformation of the banking system and the finance sector of the respective 
countries. Using a sample of twenty countries for the 2000-2005 period , Gheeraert (2014) shows 
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that development of Islamic banking in Muslim countries boosts banking sector development. 
Using a similar sample, Gheeraert and Weill (2014) claim that the development of Islamic 
banking improves macroeconomic efficiency. The recent development of Islamic banking has 
changed the financial structure of many countries by introducing a dual financial system where 
both Islamic and conventional finance are operated. This paper attempts to fill the void by 
investigating the characteristics of Islamic banking from the finance-growth perspective.  
Islamic banking is expected to offer financial products and services that are compatible 
with Islamic doctrine, and hence convince Muslim individuals and firms with religious concerns 
to have access to finance or move from the informal to the formal financial system. This suggests 
a positive impact of a dual banking system on the size of the financial intermediation sector by 
boosting savings mobilization. How efficiently savings are allocated in such an environment is 
another important subject which we attempt to examine in this paper. In a dual banking system, 
Islamic and conventional banks do not merely play a supplementary role to one another, they 
compete with each other in absorbing clients and investors because a portion of Muslims may 
have a low sensitivity to religious issues. As such, we expect the presence of Islamic banking to 
also improve the quality and efficiency of financial intermediation.  
The extant literature shows that financial development can foster economic growth. 
Recent studies (for instance Berger et al., 2004; Koetter and Wedow, 2010) suggest that, beside 
an increase in size, an improvement in quality of the financial sector can also spur economic 
growth. In this paper we investigate whether the presence of Islamic banks in a dual banking 
system can directly contribute to economic growth: On the one hand, Islamic banks may be more 
risk-averse than conventional banks and hence discourage firms' business expansion; on the 
other hand, since they invest their funds in the real economy and are not allowed to get involved 
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in speculative activities, they might stimulate economic growth more strongly than their 
conventional counterparts. Moreover, Islamic banks have the capacity to mitigate income 
inequality and poverty because they are expected to have more incentives to support social and 
development projects. Alternatively, it can be argued that Islamic banks do not contribute to 
poverty reduction differently from their conventional counterparts because they also follow 
profit-maximization strategies. However, from the demand side, the presence of Islamic finance 
can alleviate poverty by lessening financial exclusion, since some poor Muslims may prefer to 
use Sharia-complied financial products and services.   
Conventional banks might operate more efficiently in a dual banking system due to 
competition pressure enforced by the presence of Islamic banks. The competition pressure might 
be even stronger on conventional than Islamic banks, because Muslims with religious concerns 
would prefer Islamic to conventional finance; however, other Muslims are expected to be 
indifferent between the two systems. As such, one may anticipate that credit risk and cost 
inefficiency of conventional banks would decline with an increase in the market share of Islamic 
banks. Alternatively, operating in a dual banking system may deteriorate the quality of 
conventional banks' performance, since their competitors, i.e. Islamic banks, might be more 
inefficient as they offer Sharia-compliant financial products and Muslims have no other choice 
but to bank with them. 
Merton and Bodie (2004) point out that overall financial development matters more than 
the type of financial structure in place to better fuel economic growth. Nevertheless, our focus in 
this paper is on banks and not the financial system as a whole. Financial intermediation and 
financial markets have both substantial roles in economic growth. As Boyd and Smith (1998) 
show in their model, credit and equity markets are complementary components of the whole 
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financial system rather than substitutes for each other. Beck and Levine (2004) also find that the 
development of both the banking system and financial markets is positively linked with 
economic growth implying that financial services provided by stock markets are different from 
those supplied by banks. In developing countries, however, the other components of the financial 
system such as stock and bond markets, pension funds and insurance firms are not as developed 
as their banking systems. In fact, banks have the key role in mobilizing deposits and channelling 
them for investments.  
For our study, we focus on commercial banking industries of 22 Muslim countries where 
a dual banking system is practiced during the 1999 - 2009 period. We pursue our analysis using 
two sub-samples of countries based on the share of Muslim population
1
. Overall, we find that the 
effect on financial development and performance of conventional banks of having a dual banking 
system (where Islamic banks operate alongside their conventional counterparts) considerably 
depends on the level of financial development and market structure. For instance, the results 
show that higher market share of Islamic banks is associated with greater bank deposits, annual 
growth rate of private credit and private credit allocation to new businesses especially in sub-
samples of countries with relatively lower development of their financial sector, i.e. countries 
with greater share of Muslims in their population. Presence of Islamic banks can also boost the 
real economy in countries with relatively lower share of Muslims in their population, where the 
financial sector is more developed and the market share of Islamic banks is relatively higher.  
We also observe that the market share of Islamic banks is negatively linked to income 
inequality and poverty in countries with greater share of Muslims in their population and hence 
                                                            
1 Interestingly, countries with a lower share of Muslim population have on average a more developed financial 
sector and a higher market share of Islamic banks. 
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greater financial exclusion (as in such countries the financial sector is relatively less developed 
and Islamic banks have on average a lower market share). 
Our bank-level analyses indicate that presence of Islamic banks reduces credit risk and 
cost inefficiency of conventional banks in countries with lower share of Muslims in their 
population, where the market is relatively less concentrated. Table A1 in the appendix provides 
the summary of our results.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research 
motivation and econometric specifications, section 3 describes our sample of observations and 
section 4 discusses the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Research Motivation and Econometric Specifications 
2.1. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND ECONOMIC WELFARE  
The existence of Islamic financial institutions together with their conventional 
counterparts increases the number of participants and financial products which may deepen the 
financial system and improve the efficiency of the whole financial sector. We attempt to 
investigate whether the presence of Islamic banks alongside conventional banks can affect 
financial intermediation in terms of savings mobilization and funds allocation. We also explore 
whether presence of Islamic banks can affect the real economy, mitigate income inequality and 
alleviate poverty.  
2.1.a. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
Many Muslims do not use traditional financial products and services, since they believe 
that they are against their religious beliefs. They would preferably use the financial services 
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provided by the informal market
2
. A number of surveys highlight that a considerable proportion 
of Muslims prefer Sharia-compliant financial products and services. In Algeria, for instance, a 
study shows that around 20.7% of micro-enterprise owners do not apply for loans primarily due 
to religious concerns (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, 2006). In Indonesia, around 
49% of the rural population of East Java prefers Islamic finance and believes that interest is 
prohibited (C.G.A.P., 2008). Honohan (2008) finds that in Islamic Development Bank’s member 
countries (i.e. all OIC-member countries except Guyana) only 28 percent of the adult population, 
including Muslims and non-Muslims, uses the formal or semi-formal financial products and 
services for deposit accounts or borrowing activities. Given the relatively low access to finance 
in most Muslim countries, there is a considerable potential for outreaching Islamic finance; 
hence Islamic banking can contribute to financial intermediation development by transferring 
lenders and borrowers from the informal to the formal market, depending on whether the 
informal market is more or less efficient than the formal market
3
. As such, Islamic banks are 
expected to play a complementary role to conventional banks in collecting deposits. 
Islamic and conventional banking may also play a substitutive role for each other in a 
dual banking system, as a portion of Muslims may have a low sensitivity to religious issues. As 
such, Islamic banks can absorb lenders and borrowers from conventional financial institutions 
who have chosen conventional finance in the absence of Islamic finance.  
We explore whether the presence of Islamic banks has as a substitutive or complementary 
role in deposits mobilization. As such, first, we investigate how the deposits of the banking 
                                                            
2 Often known as the curb market and may play a substantial role in developing countries. 
3 Some economists believe that curb markets are more efficient in savings and investment intermediation (van 
Wijnbergen, 1983; Taylor, 1983, Buffie, 1984); however, Fry (1988) argues that informal markets are not 
necessarily as efficient as formal markets. Chandavarkar (1992) claims that curb markets are unorganized and do not 
play a substantial role in financial resource intermediation to boost economic growth. The main problem for 
examining the potential contribution of informal markets to economic growth is the lack of data.   
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system as a whole are affected by the presence of Islamic banks and then we study how the 
private credit grows in a dual banking system. We also examine the relationship between the 
volume of private credit allocated to new businesses and the market share of Islamic banks.  
2.1.b. REAL ECONOMY 
Islamic banks may boost or hinder economic growth compared to their conventional 
counterparts. On the one hand, existing studies show that religious individuals are more risk 
averse than other agents (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Osoba, 2003; Hilary and Hui, 2009). 
Similarly, Islamic financial institutions might be more risk-averse than their conventional 
counter-parts. As such, they might limit entrepreneurship by encouraging borrowers to select 
low-risk projects or excessively invest in tangible assets. On the other hand, Islamic financiers 
prefer to allocate their funds to the real economy; and they are not authorized to allocate their 
financial resources to speculative activities. Whether the presence of Islamic banks can affect 
economic growth is an empirical question, which we attempt to address in this study.  
2.1.c. INCOME INEQUALITY and POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
Islamic finance may affect income inequality and play a role in poverty alleviation. By 
establishing Islamic finance, less developed Muslim countries which suffer from lack of 
financial resources can attract foreign investment and capital from relatively rich Muslim 
countries and boost their growth and reduce income inequality (Fasih, 2012).  
One may expect that Islamic financial institutions will account for poverty alleviation in 
their business strategy alongside profit-maximization. Islam like other Abrahamic religions 
(Judaism and Christianity) encourages lending provided that it is free of interest (called 
Neshekh
4
, Usury
5
 and Riba
6
 in Judaism, Christianity and Islam respectively). The essence of 
                                                            
4 Holy Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 22: 24, Leviticus 25:36-37and Deuteronomy, 23:20-21. 
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strong prohibition of interest is to prevent the oppression of the poor. By interest, the rich can 
extract benefits from the urgent needs of the poor and would not have any incentive for business 
or investment.  Hence, Islamic finance may potentially lessen income inequality and alleviate 
poverty. Two channels can be considered for the possible impact of Islamic finance on income 
inequality and poverty: 
Profit-maximization strategy encourages financial institutions to establish their branches 
and network in large cities or capital-oriented areas rather than areas with low population density 
or low-income areas.  As such, the poor have  relatively limited access to financial products and 
services such as deposits and loans. Besides such constraints, some poor Muslims prefer to bank 
with Sharia-compliant financial institutions. Islamic financiers are expected to have more 
incentives for offering financial products and services to the poor clients. Islamic financiers are 
also expected to contribute more to social and development activities than their conventional 
counterparts. Moreover, they may prefer to finance projects that can be more beneficial for low 
income people.  
Alternatively, one may argue that a specific marketing strategy of Islamic financial 
institutions is to offer Sharia-compliant financial products and services to attract clients with 
relatively high degree of religiosity. They would hence also follow a profit-maximization 
approach similar to conventional finance and there would be few differences between Islamic 
and conventional products apart from the label assigned to them
7
. Hence, Islamic finance may 
not be more effective in reducing poverty than conventional finance. As such, it is important to 
investigate whether Islamic finance has any direct impact on income inequality and poverty. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
5 Sir Harry Page ‘In Restraint of Usury: The Lending of Money at Interest’ Chartered Institute for Public Finances 
and Accounts (CIPFA), London, 1985. 
6 Holly Quran, Chapter 1, Verses 275-279. 
7 Refer to Abedifar et al. (2013) for overview of Islamic finance and banking.  
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We adopt the following panel specification for our analyses. To control for individual 
unobservable heterogeneity across countries, we use the fixed effect technique in our estimation. 
Yj,t =  α0 + α1×ISB_Sharej,t + α2×ISW_Sharej,t +                                                                                         (1) 
α3×Foreign_Banks_Sharej,t + α4×State_Banks_Sharej,t + α5×Inflationj,t + α6×Trendt + εj,t   
 
 Where j subscript denotes individual countries and t denotes the time dimension.  
Yj,t is our dependent variable. We use the following three proxies for our financial 
intermediation study: 1) Total deposits of commercial banks to GDP ratio (Bank Deposit) 
representing the volume of deposits mobilization 2) the annual growth rate of private credit 
(Private Credit Growth) and 3) the ratio of private credit to new business registration (Private 
Credit per New Business). 
For our real economy analysis, we employ the annual growth rate of gross national 
income per capita calculated on the basis of the Atlas method (Economic Growth) and  the value 
added of the industrial sector to GDP ratio (Industry Value Added) as the dependent variable 
(Yj,t). 
Income inequality and poverty alleviation are explored using the following five proxies 
as the dependent variable (Yj,t) in Equation (1): 1) Gini index (Gini), 2) the share of people with 
less than $1.25 a day based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in total population (Poverty Ratio 
International), 3) the share of people below national poverty line in total population (Poverty 
Ratio National), 4) the intensity of poverty of people who live with less than $1.25 (Poverty Gap 
International) and 5) the share of people who live below the rural poverty line in total rural area 
population (Poverty Ratio Rural). 
ISB Share represents the share of commercial Islamic banks in the total assets of the 
whole commercial banking industry which is our variable of interest. Islamic banking can be 
introduced in the financial system in two forms: Establishment of pure Islamic banks or 
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launching Islamic branches/window by existing conventional banks. In the former case, the 
presence of Islamic banking increases both the size of the financial sector and the number of 
financial institutions yielding higher market competition; however, in the latter form, the size of 
the financial system rises without any increase in the number of participants, resulting in higher 
market power. Our variable of interest refers to the first type of introduction. We attempt to 
control for the second type by including the share of commercial Islamic window banks – i.e. 
commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional banking (ISW Share) – in the total 
assets of the aggregate commercial banking sector. The benchmark is then the share of pure 
commercial conventional banks in the total assets of the banking system, which is omitted to 
avoid perfect multi-collinearity.  
We try to capture the heterogeneities associated with the structure of the banking sector 
in terms of ownership, using the share of total assets of foreign and state-owned banks in total 
assets (Foreign Bank Share and State Bank Share). The benchmark is the share of domestic 
private banks in total assets which is dropped out from the model to avoid perfect multi-
collinearity. We also control for inflation represented by the annual growth rate of the GDP 
deflator (Inflation). Deposits mobilization, funds allocation, the real economy, income inequality 
and poverty are indeed influenced by inflation. Finally, we add a trend variable to capture the 
time trend. Table A2 in the appendix describes the variables of interest, the control variables and 
the dependent variable. 
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2.2. PERFORMANCE OF CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
Change in market structure may affect banks' performance. We study whether lending 
quality, cost efficiency and profitability of conventional banks are affected when they operate in 
a dual banking system alongside Islamic banks.  
Religious clients are more likely to prefer Islamic to conventional banking, since Islamic 
banks are supposed to comply with Sharia requirements in their operations. As such, a dual 
banking system segments the market: clients with religious beliefs may select Islamic banking, 
while others might be indifferent between Islamic and conventional financial services. Taking 
into account that religious people are more risk averse, we expect that borrowers’ quality of 
conventional banks deteriorates when they operate together with Islamic banks. Alternatively, a 
dual banking system might discipline conventional banks more effectively which might result in 
higher efficiency and loan quality.  
We estimate the following panel specification for our analyses using the fixed effect 
technique which accounts for individual unobservable heterogeneity across banks. 
Ci,t = β0 + β1×ISB_Sharej,t-1 + β2×ISW_Sharej,t-1 +                                                                                                      (2) 
β3×HHIj,t-1 + β4×Domestic_Interest_Ratej,t-1 + β5×Per_Capitaj,t-1 + β6×Per_Capita_Growthj,t-1 +  
β7×Capitali,t-1 + β8×Sizei,t-1 +                      
 
    + ξi,t 
 
 
Where i, t and j subscripts denote individual banks, time dimension and countries, 
respectively. ISB Share is our variable of interest and we study its impact on Credit Risk and 
Inefficiency of conventional banks operating in a dual banking system.  
Ci,t is our dependent variable, representing Credit Risk and Inefficiency. We use the ratio 
of impaired loans to gross loans (Impaired Loans) as a proxy for credit risk (Credit Risk). 
Impaired loans consist of non-accrual loans and loans which are past due for 90 days or more 
and still accruing. This proxy is widely used in the literature as an accounting-based credit risk 
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indicator (for instance Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Gonzalez, 2005; Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007; 
Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Fiordelisi, et al., 2011). We employ the ratio of total noninterest 
expense to total operating income (Inefficiency) for our cost inefficiency analysis.  
We control for macroeconomic factors such as market concentration (HHI), Domestic 
Interest Rate, Per Capita and Per Capita Growth together with bank-level controls including 
Capital and Size. Since the Hausman test suggests the use of the fixed effect technique, we do 
not include ownership dummies in our model. Finally, we capture year fixed effects using nine 
year dummy variables
8
. 
Besides controlling for market share of commercial Islamic window banks (ISW Share), 
we introduce four country level variables to capture cross-country variations. We control for the 
impact of banking sector concentration by adding the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to our 
model. We take into account the level of domestic interest rates (Domestic Interest Rate) in our 
analysis. The extant literature shows the influence of domestic interest rates on banks’ risk 
appetite (Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Delis and 
Kouretas, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Jimenez et al. 2013). On the one hand, banks have 
a greater risk-taking appetite when interest rates are low; on the other hand, an increase in the 
interest rate level can adversely affect the ability of borrowers to repay loans (Jarrow and 
Turnbull, 2000; Carling et al., 2007; Drehmann et al., 2010 and Alessandri and Drehmann, 
2010). Finally, we try to capture the possible impact of income level and growth in the prosperity 
of the population by including GDP per capita (Per Capita) and growth in GDP per capita (Per 
Capita Growth).  
                                                            
8 The sample covers eleven years; however, since all accounting and macro level variables are lagged for one year, 
we use nine year dummies (2001-2009) in our estimations. 
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We also control for bank-level heterogeneities. The share of equity capital in total assets 
(Capital) is included in our model. On the one hand, an increase in equity can lower moral 
hazard problems and increase the monitoring incentives of banks (Diamond, 1984). On the other 
hand, higher equity can increase banks’ risk-taking capacity. Equity capital can be considered as 
a risk aversion proxy (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; Koetter and 
Noth, 2013) and banks with higher capital ratios expect higher returns. Moreover, Jensen (1986) 
and Harris and Raviv (1990) discuss the possible impact of capital on inefficiency. They argue 
that when capital is more expensive than debt (at the margin) management might endeavor to 
reduce operating costs to offset the higher financial costs of the increase in capital required by 
regulators. Alternatively, a fall in interest expenses may reduce managerial attempts to control 
operating expenses. 
We consider the effect of size in our study by using the logarithm of total assets (Size) as 
the proxy. Larger banks can benefit from scale economies and diversification (Hughes et al., 
2001). They may target riskier activities since they might benefit from safety net subsidies 
(Kane, 2010). They might face higher competition pressure as they have larger and more 
transparent clients with relatively easier access to capital markets. Larger banks may also use 
different technologies and business models for their operations. As such, credit risk, inefficiency 
and profitability might depend on size. 
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. DATA 
Our empirical analysis is based on country and bank-level data for 22 Muslim countries
9
 
where both Islamic and conventional banking are practiced in a dual banking system during the 
1999-2009 period. We collect country-level data from the World Bank web-site.  
The bank-level data is obtained from the Bankscope database. Bankscope classifies banks 
as commercial, Islamic or other types, while an Islamic bank might be a commercial or a non-
commercial bank. Moreover, some commercial conventional banks have Islamic 
windows/branches/wings (Islamic Window Bank), and they cannot be classified as either Islamic 
or conventional banks. As such and to ensure data accuracy, we retrieve information on a bank’s 
type from the web-site of each bank.  
3.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The performance of a dual banking system may depend on the institutional environment, 
such as financial development, population’s wealth and the share of Muslims in population. For 
instance, Abedifar et al. (2013) find significant variations in performance of Islamic banks across 
countries with relatively greater Muslims’ share in population versus other Muslim countries. 
Rioja and Valev (2004) show that the finance-growth nexus depends on the level of financial 
development. Finance fuels growth in countries with relatively developed financial sectors, 
whereas the finance-growth relationship is ambiguous in countries with a less developed 
financial system. Our sample covers quite heterogeneous countries in such aspects. As such and 
following Abedifar et al. (2013), we use two sub-samples of countries based on the median 
                                                            
9  Among Organization of Islamic countries we find a dual banking system in 22 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
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value
10
 of Muslims’ share in population collected from Pew Research Center (2009). It ranges 
between 51.9% in Lebanon to 99.8% in Tunisia. The median value is 95%. Countries below the 
median value are classified in one group called “Low Muslim Countries” and the rest which are 
those with a share of Muslims above 95% are collectively called “High Muslim Countries”.  
Table I presents the descriptive statistics of our sample for Low vs. High Muslim 
Countries. The figures interestingly show that Islamic banks and Islamic window banks have 
greater market share in Low Muslim compared to High Muslim Countries (20.70% and 24.02% 
for Low Muslim Countries vs. 10.50% and 15.92% for High Muslim Countries).  Foreigners have 
greater ownership of commercial banks in High Muslim Countries compared to Low Muslim 
Countries (29.32% vs. 20.97%); however, the governmental sector of Low Muslim Countries has 
a slightly larger stake in the commercial banking system (16.80% vs. 15.84%).  
The banking system of Low Muslim Countries is more developed than that of High 
Muslim Countries (Bank Deposit is 65.13% of GDP in Low Muslim Countries, whereas it is 
merely 34.37% for High Muslim Countries). Private credit grows at a greater rate in High 
Muslim Countries compared to Low Muslim Countries (16.55% vs. 12.70%). The availability of 
private credit for new businesses is higher for Low Muslim Countries compared to High Muslim 
Countries (5.43% vs. 4.08%). 
Economic Growth is about 8% across our sub-samples, ranging from 7.91% for Low 
Muslim Countries to 8.27% for High Muslim Countries. The contribution of the industrial sector 
to GDP is 40.73% for Low Muslim Countries, whereas it is significantly lower in High Muslim 
Countries (33.66%).  
                                                            
10 The median value in our sample is 95%. 
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We do not observe a significant difference between Gini index, Poverty Ratio 
International and Poverty Gap International of Low versus High Muslim Countries. However, 
poverty in rural areas is greater in High Muslim Countries. Moreover, the headcount ratio is 
higher for this group of countries when we consider the national poverty line in lieu of 
international poverty line. 
The fifth part of the table reports other country-level indicators. The inflation rate is 
about eight percent across different groups of countries ranging from 7.08% in Low Muslim 
Countries to 8.55% in High Muslim Countries. The HHI index shows that commercial banking is 
less concentrated in Low Muslim Countries as compared to High Muslim Countries. High 
Muslim Countries face considerably higher interest rates, compared to Low Muslim Countries 
(9.90% versus 6.08%). Per Capita is significantly higher for Low Muslim Countries versus High 
Muslim Countries ($25,000 versus $5,700). However, we observe little differences between Low 
Muslim and High Muslim Countries in terms of the annual growth rate of Per Capita (1.62% and 
1.94%, respectively).  
The last part of Table I describes our bank-level variables for conventional banks 
operating in our countries of study. We observe that conventional banks of Low Muslim 
Countries are smaller in size, have lower credit risk and are more cost efficient than those of 
High Muslim Countries.   
 [TABLE I] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN A DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 
 To explore the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and financial 
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intermediation, we estimate the Equation (1), using fixed effect technique and illustrate the 
results in Table II. The first three columns display our results for the Low Muslim Countries sub-
sample. In the first column, we use Bank Deposit as the dependent variable and regress it on the 
market share of Islamic banks (ISB Share) and a set of control variables, including ISW Share, 
Foreign Banks Share, State Banks Share, Inflation and Trend. The results show little relationship 
between the market share of Islamic banks and Bank Deposit. ISW Share also depicts little 
association with the dependent variable. As expected, we observe a negative correlation between 
Bank Deposit and the market share of foreign and Governmental ownership in the commercial 
banking industry. Inflation also exhibits a negative association with Bank Deposit. The Trend 
variable appears with a positive coefficient suggesting that Bank Deposit increases over time.  
In the second column, we investigate how private credit grows in the presence of Islamic 
banks. We use the average annual growth rate of private credit (Private Credit Growth) in lieu of 
Bank Deposit as the dependent variable and estimate our model. We find no significant 
association between ISB Share and the yearly growth rate of commercial banks’ private credit. In 
the next step, we explore the linkage between private credit allocation to new businesses and the 
market share of Islamic banks. As such, in the third column, we replace Private Credit Growth 
with Private Credit per New Business. We find a positive relationship between ISB Share and the 
dependent variable. ISW Share also depicts a positive association with the dependent variable.  
The second set of three columns display our results for High Muslim Countries, using the 
same specifications of columns (1) to (3). The market share of Islamic banks exhibits a positive 
linkage with Bank Deposit, Private Credit Growth and Private Credit per New Business. Overall, 
the relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and development of financial 
intermediation is mostly observed in High Muslim Countries with a relatively less developed 
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financial sector. 
[TABLE II] 
4.1.b. REAL ECONOMY 
We estimate Equation (1) using the annual growth rate of gross national income per 
capita calculated based on the Atlas method (Economic Growth) and  the value added of the 
industrial sector to GDP ratio (Industry Value Added) as the dependent variable to investigate the 
relationship between Islamic banking presence in a commercial banking market and the real 
economy. Table III displays the results of our estimations using the fixed effect technique. 
In the first column, we study the sample of Low Muslim Countries and regress Economic 
Growth on our variable of interest, i.e. ISB Share, while controlling for ISW Share, Foreign Bank 
Share, State Bank Share, Inflation and Trend. We find a positive association between ISB Share 
and our dependent variable. We also observe a negative relationship between Governmental 
ownership of commercial banks and Economic Growth. Inflation depicts a positive linkage with 
our dependent variable. In the second column we use Industry Value Added in lieu of Economic 
Growth and find little association with our variable of interest, i.e. ISB Share. Columns (3) and 
(4) display our results for High Muslim Countries which show no significant relationship 
between ISB Share and our dependent variables, i.e. Economic Growth and Industry Value 
Added. Overall, we find a significantly positive relationship for the Low Muslim Countries sub-
sample with more developed financial sector and greater market share of Islamic banks.  
 [TABLE III] 
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4.1.c. INCOME INEQUALITY and POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
In this section, we explore the relationship between Islamic banking presence in the 
banking industry and income inequality and poverty alleviation. We estimate Equation (1) using 
1) Gini, 2) Poverty Ratio International, 3) Poverty Ratio National, 4) Poverty Gap International 
and 5) Poverty Ratio Rural as the dependent variable. Table IV illustrates the results for the two 
sub-samples of Low and High Muslim Countries. The former group of countries is analyzed in 
columns (1) and (5) and the latter sub-sample is studied in columns (6) to (10).  
In the first column, we regress Gini on ISB Share and control for ISW Share, Foreign 
Banks Share, State Banks Share, Inflation and Trend. The results show a negative linkage 
between Gini and the market share of Islamic banks in total commercial banking. We use 
Poverty Ratio International as the dependent variable in the second column and find no 
significant association with the market share of Islamic banks. In the third column, we use 
Poverty Ratio National which accounts for national poverty line in lieu of international poverty 
line and find no significant relationship similarly to our previous finding. In column (4) we use 
Poverty Gap, which represents the intensity of poverty, as the dependent variable. The market 
share of Islamic banks displays no significant relationship with Poverty Gap. The fifth column 
presents our analysis of the poverty ratio in rural areas. Our estimation shows little linkage of 
ISB Share with Poverty Ratio Rural.  
Columns (6) to (10) illustrate our analysis for the High Muslim Countries sub-sample, 
using the same specifications of columns (1) to (5). In column (6), we find that Gini is negatively 
associated with ISB Share and ISW Share. In column (7), we use Poverty Ratio International as 
the dependent variable and find a negative relationship with the market share of Islamic banks. 
ISW Share also depicts a negative relationship with the dependent variable. The coefficient of 
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Trend shows that Poverty Ratio International declines over time. In the eighth column, the 
national poverty line is used to define the poverty ratio. Our analysis shows a negative linkage 
between ISB Share and the dependent variable which is in line with our finding in column (7). 
We also observe a positive association of Poverty Ratio National with foreign and state-
ownerships. In column (9), we look into the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks 
and the intensity of poverty represented by Poverty Gap. Our analysis shows that ISB Share is 
negatively associated with the dependent variable. ISW Share also depicts a negative linkage 
with Poverty Gap. The coefficient of Trend shows that Poverty Gap declines over time.  Finally, 
in column (10), we explore the relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and 
poverty in rural areas and observe little linkage between them. We find a significant association 
between ISB Share and our proxies for poverty alleviation in High Muslim Countries where the 
market share of Islamic banks is relatively low compared to the share of Muslim population. 
Lessening financial exclusion and outreaching Muslims can be one explanation for this finding 
which requires detailed data for possible confirmation. 
 [TABLE IV] 
 
4.2. PERFORMANCE OF CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
4.2.a. CREDIT RISK  
 In this section, we explore the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and 
loan quality (Credit Risk) of conventional banks. We employ the ratio of impaired loans on gross 
loans as the Credit Risk proxy and estimate Equation (2) using fixed effect technique. We 
analyze our sub-samples of Low and High Muslim Countries. Table VI presents the results.  
 Columns (1) to (3) display the results for Low Muslim Countries. In the first column we 
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regress Credit Risk on ISB Share, while controlling for ISW Share and year dummies. In column 
(2), we add our country-level variables, including HHI, Domestic Interest Rate, Per Capita and 
Per Capita Growth to our model. Column (3) illustrates the results when we control for Capital 
and Size to capture bank-level heterogeneities. We observe that ISB Share depicts a negative 
linkage with Credit Risk. Higher Domestic Interest Rate is also associated with a higher Credit 
Risk as it adversely affects borrowers’ ability for loan repayments which is line with Jarrow and 
Turnbull (2000), Carling et al. (2007), Drehmann et al. (2010) and Alessandri and Drehmann 
(2010). In columns (4) to (6), we study our sample of High Muslim Countries using the same 
specifications of columns (1) to (3). The results show little relationship between ISB Share and 
Credit Risk of conventional banks. However, Per Capita depicts a negative linkage with Credit 
Risk. 
  Overall, we find a positive impact of the market share of Islamic banks and the loan 
quality of conventional banks operating in Low Muslim Countries wherein the commercial 
banking market is less concentrated with more conventional commercial banks with smaller size.  
[TABLE V] 
4.2.b. INEFFICIENCY MODEL 
 We estimate Equation (2), using the ratio of total noninterest expense to total operating 
income (Inefficiency) as the proxy. We estimate our model for Low and High Muslim Countries 
sub-samples. Table VII presents the estimations.  
 Columns (1) to (3) illustrate the analysis for Low Muslim Countries. In the first column 
we regress Inefficiency on ISB Share, while controlling for ISW Share and year dummies. 
Country-level variables including HHI, Domestic Interest Rate, Per Capita and Per Capita 
Growth are added to the model in column (2). In the next step, column (3), we control for 
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Capital and Size of conventional banks. In all three specifications, ISB Share depicts a negative 
link with Inefficiency. We also find that an increase in Domestic Interest Rate and Per Capita 
Growth is associated with a decline in Inefficiency; whereas, Per Capita displays a positive 
linkage with Inefficiency. In columns (4) to (6) we estimate our model for High Muslim 
Countries, with the same specifications of columns (1) to (3). In spite of our findings for the Low 
Muslim Countries sub-sample, we find no significant linkage between ISB Share and 
Inefficiency. 
 Overall and similar to our credit risk analysis in the previous section, we find a 
significant negative relationship between ISB Share and conventional banks’ Inefficiency for the 
Low Muslim Countries sub-sample with a less concentrated commercial banking market.  
[TABLE VI] 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate whether the presence of Islamic commercial banks alongside 
their conventional counterparts can foster the development of the overall commercial banking 
sector and economic welfare. Moreover, we explore the possible implications for conventional 
banks of operating in a dual banking system. 
During the recent decades, Islamic banking has grown fast in many Muslim countries. As 
such, a dual banking system has emerged, where both Islamic and conventional banks share the 
market. Islamic finance is expected to offer Sharia-compatible financial products and services. 
This suggests a considerable potential for lessening financial exclusion and outreaching Muslims 
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who refrain from using the conventional borrowing and lending instruments or prefer Islamic 
banking to the conventional one.  
Islamic banks may behave differently from their conventional counterparts in several 
ways: they are not authorized to get involved in speculative activities. They are supposed to act 
as the agent of investment account holders for allocating their savings to profitable projects. 
They might be more risk-averse and have stronger preference for investing in the real economy 
than conventional banks. Moreover, the coexistence of Islamic and conventional banking could 
increase the efficiency of the whole banking system by improving competition. 
We study 22 Muslim countries with a dual banking system during the 1999-2009 period. 
Due to considerable heterogeneity among the countries under study, we split them into two sub-
samples based on the relative importance of Muslim population. 
 First, we investigate the possible relationship between Islamic commercial banking and 
financial intermediation development. The results show a positive relationship between the 
presence of Islamic banks and bank deposits (scaled by GDP), the annual growth rate of private 
credit and private credit allocation to new businesses especially in countries with a less 
developed financial sector. In terms of the real economy, we find a significantly positive 
relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and economic growth in countries with a 
more developed financial sector and greater market share of Islamic banks. 
We also explore the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and income 
inequality and poverty alleviation. We observe that an increase in the market share of Islamic 
banks is positively associated with a decline in income inequality and poverty in countries with 
greater share of Muslim population; surprisingly in such countries Islamic banks are relatively 
less present and hence financial exclusion might be more serious. 
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 We also investigate the relationship between Islamic banks' presence and the 
performance of conventional banks in terms of lending quality (credit risk) and cost inefficiency. 
The market share of Islamic banks is negatively linked with the credit risk and cost inefficiency 
of conventional banks in countries with relatively lower share of Muslim population. These 
countries have a relatively less concentrated market . The presence of Islamic banks in such 
countries might therefore discipline conventional banks more effectively and hence encourage 
managers to lower credit risk and cost inefficiency. Overall, the results show that the presence 
Islamic banks alongside conventional banks can affect financial development, economic welfare 
and the performance of conventional banks. The extent and modality of such effects considerably 
depend on the level of financial development and the market structure of countries within which 
a dual banking system operates.  
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Appendices 
 
Table A1. Summary of Results 
 
This table provides a summary of our results for Financial Intermediation analysis (Bank Deposit, Private Credit Growth and 
Private Credit per New Business), Real Economy analysis (Economic Growth and Industry-Value Added), income inequality and 
poverty alleviation analysis (Gini, Poverty Ratio International, Poverty Ratio National, Poverty Gap, Poverty Ratio Rural) and 
conventional banks’ performance (Credit Risk and Cost Inefficiency). See Table A2 for variable definitions and section 2 for 
econometric specifications. 
  
  Muslim Share in Population 
  
  
Low Muslim Countries 
[below median] 
High Muslim Countries 
[above median] 
Financial Intermediation   
  
 
Bank Deposit   0 +++ 
 
Private Credit Growth   0 ++ 
 
Private Credit per New Business   ++ +++ 
Real Economy   
  
 
Economic Growth   +++ 0 
 
Industry Value Added   0 0 
Income Inequality & Poverty Alleviation   
  
 
Gini   --- -- 
 
Poverty Ratio, International   0 --- 
 
Poverty Ratio, National   0 -- 
 
Poverty Gap   0 --- 
 
Poverty Ratio, Rural   0 0 
Conventional Banks’ Performance   
  
 
Credit Risk   -- 0 
 
Cost Inefficiency   - 0 
+: positive relationship, significant at 10% level.    -: negative relationship, significant at 10% level. 
++: positive relationship, significant at 5% level.    --: negative relationship, significant at 5% level. 
+++: positive relationship, significant at 1% level.   ---: negative relationship, significant at 1% level. 
0: no significant relationship. 
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Table A2. Variable Description  
 
This table presents description of variables used in this study. 
Variables Description 
Commercial Banks Structure  
ISB Share The share of Islamic banks in total assets of all commercial banks. 
ISW Share 
The share of total assets of commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional products in total assets 
of all commercial banks. 
Foreign Banks Share The share of foreign-owned banks in total assets of commercial banks. 
State Banks Share The share of state-owned banks in total assets of commercial banks. 
Financial Intermediation  
Bank Deposit The ratio of commercial bank deposits on GDP. 
Private Credit Growth The annual growth rate of private credit. 
Private Credit per New Business The ratio of private credit on the number of new business registration. 
Real Economy  
Economic Growth The annual growth rate of gross national income per capita calculated based on Atlas method. 
Industry Value Added The value added of the industrial sector to GDP ratio. 
Income Inequality & Poverty Alleviation 
Gini The Gini coefficient used as a measure of income inequality. 
Poverty Ratio International Percentage of population below the international poverty line defined as $1.25 a day (PPP). 
Poverty Ratio National Percentage of population below the national poverty line. 
Poverty Gap Poverty gap – measuring the intensity of poverty - at the international poverty line. 
Poverty Ratio Rural Percentage of rural population below the rural poverty line. 
Other Country Level Heterogeneities 
Inflation The annual inflation rate measured by GDP deflator. 
HHI 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is a proxy for market concentration: 
                                                
 
     
  
   . It has a value between zero and one 
hundred. Higher values show that the market is more concentrated. 
Domestic Interest Rate 
Deposit interest rate provided by the World Bank website; for years and countries with missing observations, 
the data is obtained from the central bank web-sites. 
Per Capita GDP per capita (th. $), measured by PPP approach (constant 2005 international). 
Per Capita Growth The annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
Bank-Level Analysis  
Credit Risk Represented by the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans (Impaired Loans). 
Inefficiency The ratio of total noninterest expense on total operating revenue. 
Size The logarithm of total assets. 
Capital Equity capital to asset ratio. 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for 22 countries where commercial Islamic and conventional banking are practiced 
for the 1999-2009 period. We split the sample into two parts, on the basis of the median value of Corruption Perception Index 
and Muslims Share in population.  
 
 
Countries with Muslims Share in Population 
below the Median (95%) 
 
Countries with Muslims Share in Population 
above the Median (95%) 
 
 Variables Obs Mean S.D. Min Max  Obs Mean S.D Min Max T-Stat.† 
Banking System Structure             
 ISB Share 110 20.70 25.47 0.00 100.00  114 10.50 17.14 0.00 72.25 3.51*** 
 ISW Share 110 24.02 22.27 0.00 83.59  114 15.92 28.09 0.00 91.20 2.39** 
 Foreign Banks Share 110 20.97 19.98 0.00 92.75  114 29.32 29.11 0.00 97.23 -2.51** 
 State Banks Share 110 16.80 24.86 0.00 100.00  114 15.84 23.31 0.00 98.41 0.30 
Financial Intermediation             
 Bank Deposit 82 65.13 28.51 25.07 139.38  109 34.37 22.44 6.98 105.91 8.07*** 
 Private Credit Growth 61 12.70 13.00 -38.6 42.18  92 16.55 17.39 -24.6 110.05 -1.56 
 Private Credit per New Business 17 5.43 2.67 2.69 11.58  36 4.08 3.11 0.77 13.99 1.62 
Real Economy             
 Economic Growth 91 7.91 8.33 -15.2 31.03  103 8.27 9.60 -21.1 44.83 -0.28 
 Industry Value Added 84 40.73 12.65 20.19 71.56  110 33.66 13.64 12.53 66.76 3.73*** 
Income Inequality & Poverty Alleviation         
 Gini 13 35.55 5.70 28.99 46.21  25 38.28 4.68 30.02 47.28 -1.49 
 Poverty Ratio International 16 19.45 19.79 0.00 58.59  25 13.99 14.28 0.00 44.19 0.95 
 Poverty Ratio National 17 18.59 11.38 3.60 48.90  23 28.76 11.99 13.00 55.20 -2.7*** 
 Poverty Gap International 16 4.87 5.73 0.00 18.61  25 3.65 4.19 0.00 14.34 0.74 
 Poverty Ratio Rural 17 22.84 11.29 7.10 52.30  19 39.71 12.27 19.00 65.10 -4.3*** 
Conventional Banks Characteristics          
 Total Assets ($ m) 1582 3,380 6,790 5.67 59,400  837 5,356 11,200 2.21 87,900 -4.7*** 
 Impaired Loans 1098 10.81 13.03 0.00 72.19  500 12.30 14.33 0.08 72.19 -1.98** 
 Inefficiency 1397 55.38 31.27 8.72 208.73  716 62.76 36.75 8.72 208.73 -4.6*** 
 Capital 1582 13.46 10.90 0.58 61.66  837 13.57 11.04 0.58 61.66 -0.25 
Other Country Level Heterogeneities         
 Inflation 110 7.08 8.54 -24.3 29.02  114 8.55 11.93 -30.1 54.18 -1.06 
 HHI 110 21.94 14.57 6.19 86.17  114 27.99 13.89 9.51 58.69 -3.2*** 
 Domestic Interest Rate 104 6.08 3.80 0.94 25.74  113 9.90 12.13 1.63 78.43 -3.2*** 
 Per Capita 110 25,169 24,434 932 74,164  114 5,736 5,543 1,513 20,565 8.14*** 
 Per Capita Growth 110 1.62 4.27 -11.99 14.18  114 1.94 3.14 -7.04 15.73 -0.63 
† T-Stat.of mean equality test. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table AI for variable 
definitions. 
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Table II. Financial Intermediation Analysis  
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the Equation (1), using bank deposits on GDP ratio (Bank Deposit), the annual growth rate 
of private credit (Private Credit Growth) and the ratio of private credit to new business registration (Private Credit per New 
Business) as the dependent variable. We employ the fixed effect technique for our estimation.  
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of the share of Muslims in country’s population. Countries 
below the median value of Muslims share in total population are classified in one group (Low Muslim Countries) and the rest in 
the other group called High Muslim Countries. The median value of Muslims share in population is 95%. The results for Low 
Muslim Countries are presented in columns (1) to (3), whereas columns (4) to (6) display our analysis for High Muslim 
Countries. 
We regress our dependent variables, i.e. Bank Deposit, Private Credit Growth and Private Credit per New Business, on our 
variable of interest, i.e. ISB Share and control variables (ISW Share, Foreign Banks Share, State Banks Share, Inflation and 
Trend). In columns (1) and (4) we use Bank Deposit as the dependent variable. Columns (2) and (5) present our analysis when we 
use Private Credit Growth in our analysis in lieu of Bank Deposit. Finally, Private Credit per New Business is used as the 
dependent variable in columns (3) and (6).  
 Low Muslim Countries  High Muslim Countries 
Variables Bank Deposit Private Credit Growth 
Private Credit  
Per New Business 
 Bank Deposit Private Credit Growth 
Private Credit  
Per New Business 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
ISB Share (1) 0.043 0.190 0.148**  0.148*** 0.671** 0.389*** 
 (0.24) (1.14) (5.17)  (3.43) (2.79) (5.10) 
ISW Share (2) 0.187 0.060 0.122**  0.247*** 0.211 0.530** 
 (0.58) (0.40) (4.65)  (5.46) (0.65) (2.91) 
Foreign Banks Share (3) -0.312*** -0.060 0.139  -0.037 0.158 -0.067 
 (-3.49) (-0.43) (1.27)  (-0.78) (1.16) (-1.19) 
State Banks Share (4) -0.281* 0.012 -0.062  -0.065 0.361** 0.007 
 (-2.23) (0.16) (-2.03)  (-1.53) (2.77) (0.16) 
Inflation (5) -0.670*** 0.072 -0.054  -0.101 0.009 0.056* 
 (-3.54) (0.26) (-0.65)  (-1.27) (0.02) (2.30) 
Trend (6) 0.809 1.515 0.344  1.250*** 0.853 0.265* 
 (0.95) (1.88) (2.64)  (7.22) (1.56) (2.14) 
Constant (0) 73.461*** 0.363 -6.581  25.681*** -9.490 -3.551 
 (6.19) (0.05) (-2.24)  (12.45) (-0.76) (-0.91) 
        
Observations 82 61 17  109 92 36 
R-squared 0.322 0.181 0.489  0.639 0.109 0.715 
Number of Country 10 8 3  11 11 6 
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table A2 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table III. Real Economy Analysis  
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the Equation (1), using the annual growth rate of gross national income per capita 
calculated based on Atlas method (Economic Growth) and the value added of the industrial sector to GDP ratio (Industry Value 
Added) as the dependent variable. We employ the fixed effect technique for our estimation.  
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of the share of Muslims in country’s population. Countries 
below the median value of Muslims share in total population are classified in one group (Low Muslim Countries) and the rest in 
the other group called High Muslim Countries. The median value of Muslims share in population is 95%. The results for Low 
Muslim Countries are presented in columns (1) and (2), whereas columns (3) and (4) display our analysis for High Muslim 
Countries. 
We regress our dependent variables, i.e. Economic Growth and Industry Value Added, on our variable of interest, i.e. ISB Share 
and control variables (ISW Share, Foreign Bank Share, State Bank Share, Inflation and Trend). In columns (1) and (3) we use 
Economic Growth as the dependent variable. Columns (2) and (4) present our analysis when we use Industry Value Added in our 
analysis in lieu of Economic Growth.  
 Low Muslim Countries  High Muslim Countries 
Variables Economic Growth Industry Value Added  Economic Growth Industry Value Added 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ISB Share (1) 0.356*** 0.008  -0.078 -0.009 
 (4.07) (0.10)  (-0.83) (-0.08) 
ISW Share (2) 0.241 0.064  -0.182 -0.144 
 (1.78) (1.02)  (-1.63) (-1.40) 
Foreign Banks Share (3) 0.012 0.077  0.065 -0.019 
 (0.16) (1.59)  (0.82) (-0.37) 
State Banks Share (4) -0.146** 0.031  0.052 -0.059 
 (-2.87) (0.83)  (0.59) (-0.92) 
Inflation (5) 0.293** 0.156***  0.197 0.138** 
 (2.96) (6.74)  (1.06) (2.98) 
Trend (6) -0.124 0.176  1.071*** 0.230 
 (-0.23) (0.73)  (3.44) (0.96) 
Constant (0) -3.796 35.131***  1.719 35.326*** 
 (-0.98) (14.02)  (0.39) (20.64) 
      
Observations 91 84  103 110 
R-squared 0.364 0.375  0.176 0.312 
Number of Country 11 9  11 10 
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table A2 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table IV. Income Inequality and Poverty Alleviation Analysis – Low Muslims vs. High Muslims Countries 
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the Equation (1), using 1) Gini index (Gini), 2) the share of people with less than $1.25 a day based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in total 
population (Poverty Ratio International), 3) the share of people below national poverty line in total population (Poverty Ratio National), 4) the intensity of poverty of people who 
live with less than $1.25 (Poverty Gap) and 5) the share of people live below the rural poverty line in total population of rural area (Poverty Ratio Rural) as the dependent variable. 
We employ the fixed effect technique for our estimation.  
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of the share of Muslims in country’s population. Countries below the median value of Muslims share in total 
population are classified in one group (Low Muslim Countries) and the rest in the other group called High Muslim Countries. The median value of Muslims share in population is 
95%. The results for Low Muslim Countries are presented in columns (1) to (5), whereas columns (6) to (10) display our analysis for High Muslim Countries. 
We regress our dependent variables, i.e. Gini, Poverty Ratio International, Poverty Ratio National, Poverty Gap International and Poverty Ratio Rural, on our variable of interest, 
i.e. ISB Share and control variables (ISW Share, Foreign Bank Share, State Bank Share, Inflation and Trend). In columns (1) and (6) we use Gini as the dependent variable. 
Columns (2) and (7) present our analysis when we use Poverty Ratio International in our analysis. Poverty Ratio National is employed as the dependent variable in columns (3) 
and (8). In columns (4) and (9), Poverty Gap International is used as the dependent variable. Finally, in columns (5) and (10), we use Poverty Ratio Rural as the dependent 
variable in our analysis.   
 Low Muslim Countries  High Muslim Countries 
Variables Gini 
Poverty Ratio 
International 
Poverty Ratio 
National 
Poverty 
Gap 
Poverty Ratio 
Rural 
 Gini 
Poverty Ratio 
International 
Poverty Ratio 
National 
Poverty 
Gap 
Poverty Ratio 
Rural 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ISB Share (1) -1.311*** 0.360 0.414 0.112 0.428  -0.169** -0.413*** -0.329** -0.126*** -0.334 
 (-17.33) (0.55) (0.80) (0.48) (0.79)  (-2.84) (-5.00) (-2.62) (-4.00) (-1.65) 
ISW Share (2) -0.798*** 0.197 0.247 0.088 0.224  -0.257* -0.543*** -0.426 -0.176*** -0.737 
 (-13.93) (0.44) (0.59) (0.58) (0.48)  (-2.25) (-3.54) (-1.60) (-3.38) (-1.06) 
Foreign Banks Share (3) -0.571*** -0.008 0.188 0.049 0.248  0.006 -0.079 0.195** -0.023 -0.135 
 (-16.15) (-0.02) (0.60) (0.33) (0.72)  (0.12) (-0.93) (2.72) (-0.78) (-0.41) 
State Banks Share (4) 0.096*** -0.069 0.073 0.007 0.043  0.035 -0.042 0.294*** -0.006 0.303 
 (7.64) (-0.44) (0.57) (0.12) (0.32)  (0.43) (-0.33) (3.59) (-0.13) (1.29) 
Inflation (5) 0.617*** 0.052 0.063 0.045 0.028  0.002 -0.130 0.027 -0.044 -0.049 
 (37.83) (0.10) (0.27) (0.26) (0.09)  (0.03) (-1.78) (0.29) (-1.84) (-0.28) 
Trend (6) 2.494*** -1.612* -0.805* -0.568* -0.919*  -0.410 -1.032** -1.503*** -0.301** 0.083 
 (31.70) (-2.45) (-2.45) (-2.25) (-2.66)  (-1.86) (-3.23) (-3.86) (-2.76) (0.08) 
Constant (0) 72.140*** 22.923 7.721 3.583 11.882  45.529*** 35.373*** 38.007*** 10.240*** 54.668* 
 (22.14) (0.91) (0.37) (0.41) (0.53)  (8.87) (4.30) (3.70) (3.63) (2.24) 
            
Observations 13 16 17 16 17  25 25 23 25 19 
R-squared 0.997 0.579 0.442 0.514 0.450  0.531 0.684 0.855 0.684 0.531 
Number of Country 6 5 4 5 4  9 9 8 9 7 
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table A2 for variable definitions. 
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Table V. Credit Risk Analysis 
 
This table presents the estimation of Equation (2), using the ratio of impaired loans on gross loans as the proxy for credit risk 
(Credit Risk). We apply fixed effect technique for our estimation.  
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of the share of Muslims in country’s population. Countries 
below the median value of Muslims share in total population are classified in one group (Low Muslim Countries) and the rest in 
the other group called High Muslim Countries. The median value of Muslims share in population is 95%. The results for Low 
Muslim Countries are presented in columns (1) to (3), whereas columns (4) to (6) display our analysis for High Muslim 
Countries.   
We regress Impaired Loans as the proxy for Credit Risk on our variable of interest, i.e. ISB Share, and control variables (ISW 
Share, HHI, Domestic Interest Rate, Per Capita, Per Capita Growth, Capital, Size and year dummies). In the first column we 
regress Impaired Loans on ISB Share, while controlling for ISW Share and year dummies. In column (2), we include HHI, 
Domestic Interest Rate, Per Capita and Per Capita Growth in our model. Column (3) illustrates the result when we add Capital 
and Size to our model. Columns (4) to (6) depict the result when we use High Muslim Countries sub-sample.  
Variables Low Muslim Countries  High Muslim Countries 
 (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
ISB Share (β1) -0.149 -0.299** -0.306**  -0.267 -0.202 -0.216 
 (-1.56) (-2.00) (-2.19)  (-1.65) (-1.02) (-1.15) 
ISW Share (β2) -0.051 -0.115 -0.131  -0.031 0.049 0.032 
 (-0.72) (-1.04) (-1.32)  (-0.24) (0.31) (0.22) 
HHI (β3)  -0.070 -0.020   -0.254 -0.267 
  (-0.39) (-0.13)   (-1.42) (-1.42) 
Domestic Interest Rate (β4)  0.473*** 0.484***   -0.119 -0.139 
  (2.68) (2.63)   (-0.77) (-0.92) 
Per Capita (β5)  0.415 0.469   -5.250* -5.108* 
  (1.32) (1.65)   (-1.78) (-1.93) 
Per Capita Growth (β6)  0.209 0.194   0.131 0.114 
  (1.25) (1.15)   (1.22) (1.06) 
Capital (β7)   -0.122*    0.055 
   (-1.88)    (0.29) 
Size (β8)   -0.084    -0.921 
   (-0.16)    (-0.72) 
Constant (β0) 14.044*** 4.928 6.457  13.923*** 52.226** 64.758** 
 (9.32) (1.15) (0.82)  (7.53) (2.57) (2.34) 
        
Observations 911 911 911  421 421 421 
R-squared 0.110 0.134 0.142  0.094 0.137 0.146 
Number of Bank 184 184 184  92 92 92 
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table A2 
for variable definitions. 
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Table VI. Cost Inefficiency Analysis 
 
This table presents the estimation of Equation (2), using the ratio of total noninterest expense on total operating income 
(Inefficiency) as the proxy for cost inefficiency. We apply fixed effect technique for our estimation.  
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of the share of Muslims in country’s population. Countries 
below the median value of Muslims share in total population are classified in one group (Low Muslim Countries) and the rest in 
the other group called High Muslim Countries. The median value of Muslims share in population is 95%. The results for Low 
Muslim Countries are presented in columns (1) to (3), whereas columns (4) to (6) display our analysis for High Muslim 
Countries.   
We regress Cost Inefficiency on our variable of interest, i.e. ISB Share, and control variables (ISW Share, HHI, Domestic Interest 
Rate, Per Capita, Per Capita Growth, Capital, Size and year dummies). In the first column we regress Cost Inefficiency on ISB 
Share, while controlling for ISW Share and year dummies. In column (2), we include HHI, Domestic Interest Rate, Per Capita 
and Per Capita Growth in our model. Column (3) illustrates the result when we add Capital and Size to our model. Columns (4) 
to (6) depict the result when we use High Muslim Countries sub-sample. Year dummies are included by not reported in the table. 
All the right-hand-side variables are lagged for one period. 
 Low Muslim Countries  High Muslim Countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
ISB Share (β1) -0.224** -0.315* -0.318*  -0.142 -0.156 -0.159 
 (-2.01) (-1.93) (-1.92)  (-1.20) (-1.31) (-1.24) 
ISW Share (β2) -0.150 -0.218 -0.211  0.262 0.299 0.300 
 (-1.48) (-1.61) (-1.57)  (1.12) (1.26) (1.29) 
HHI (β3)  0.286 0.261   -0.404** -0.352* 
  (1.34) (1.13)   (-2.59) (-1.97) 
Domestic Interest Rate (β4)  -0.665** -0.670**   0.040 -0.017 
  (-2.14) (-2.10)   (0.27) (-0.10) 
Per Capita (β5)  0.783** 0.792**   -7.023 -7.289* 
  (2.40) (2.47)   (-1.62) (-1.70) 
Per Capita Growth (β6)  -0.606** -0.605**   0.810*** 0.748*** 
  (-2.41) (-2.39)   (2.88) (2.81) 
Capital (β7)   0.086    0.217 
   (0.92)    (1.06) 
Size (β8)   0.156    -1.408 
   (0.21)    (-1.06) 
Constant (β0) 56.555*** 54.360*** 51.426***  66.281*** 108.908*** 126.102*** 
 (20.99) (13.94) (4.34)  (22.10) (4.51) (3.86) 
        
Observations 1,151 1,151 1,151  576 576 576 
R-squared 0.027 0.039 0.040  0.117 0.163 0.179 
Number of Bank 207 207 207  115 115 115 
Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table A2 
for variable definitions. 
 
